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This paper investigates the corporate management of non-conventional risks such as (among 
others risks) environmental risks and disasters, medical malpractice, litigation-related risks, 
and terrorism risks (see e.g. Gollier (2007), p.11). Environmental and catastrophic risks have 
been  studied  by  a  number  of  authors.  Zagalski  [1991],  Kronenberg  [1995],  Freeman  and 
Kunreuther (1997), and Lesourd and Schilizzi (2003: chapter 7) have been concerned with the 
specific features of environmental risks. Catastrophic risks have been studied by Kleffner and 
Doherty (1996), Zeckhauser [1996], and, in the context of crop insurance, by Miranda and 
Glauber [1996] and Duncan and Myers (2000). Many of these studies show that insurance and 
reinsurance  companies  can  refuse  to  insure  non-conventional  risks  such  as  environmental 
risks.  
Information about the probability distributions of such non-conventional risks is most often 
incomplete  or  unknown.  This  leads  to  behaviours  that  can  be  incompatible  with  standard 
expected utility theory, as was clearly demonstrated by Ellsberg [1961] in his seminal paper. 
In this paper, he defines ambiguity as uncertainty on the probability distributions. In this case, 
decision makers will consider a range of probability distributions and will usually give more 
weight  to  the  more  pessimistic  ones.  This  is  the  standard  interpretation  of  the  so-called 
Ellsberg paradox.  
Uncertainty regarding probability distributions also means that different agents will typically 
have different and even conflicting estimates of the risks involved. One may see this as a 
consequence of Ellsberg’s ambiguity and will be of importance in the analysis that follows. In 
particular, different parties to an insurance contract for non-conventional risks, the insured  
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firm, the insurer and the reinsurer, can, if the risks are ambiguous, have diverging estimates of 
the risks involved. Cabantous (2007) has examined the effects on insurability when different 
parties have conflicting probability estimates. She concludes that insurers will set a higher 
premium for a risk with ambiguous probability than for a risk with non ambiguous probability. 
When  the parties to an insurance policy disagree on the set of probability distributions, she 
adds  that  insurers  will  set  a  higher  premium  for  an  ambiguous  risk  with  a  conflicting 
probability than for an ambiguous risk with a consensual but imprecise probability. 
Of the techniques available for the management of uninsurable corporate risks is the setting up 
of  a  captive  insurance  company  (Porat  and  Powers  1995,  1999;  Scordis,  Barrese,  and 
Yokohama, 2007). The particular case of environmental risks has been discussed by Lesourd 
and  Schilizzi  (2001).  A  captive  insurance  company  (hereafter  simply  referred  to  as  "a 
captive") is an insurance company entirely owned by a parent company, providing insurance 
services mainly, or exclusively, to its parent company. A captive provides direct access to 
reinsurance;  however,  in  some  cases  a  reinsurance  captive  can  be  established,  which 
specializes in reinsuring its parent company. The potential advantages of a captive lie, first, in 
its direct access to reinsurance, saving  transaction costs of intermediation and, secondly, in 
the fact that there no longer is the risk of moral hazard, since the parent company and the 
captive should in principle share the same information. For covering non-conventional risks, 
setting up a captive can be cheaper than contracting conventional insurance: the captive is able 
to charge lower premiums than conventional insurance contracts, for various reasons, some of 
which will be examined in this paper. Captives constitute a particular case, and a particular 
practical solution, of the more general self-insurance problem (Chiu, 2000; Gollier, 2003).  
Our concern in this paper differs from most of the literature on insurance captives, which has 
mostly been concerned with their fiscal status (see e.g. Lai and Witt, 1995; Porat and Powers, 
1995, 1999). Here we are interested in determining the conditions under which a captive will 
be  preferred  to  conventional  insurance  when  risks  are  ambiguous  and  the  parties  have 
different and possibly conflicting perceptions of the risks involved. Among the few studies 
that discuss non-fiscal issues concerning captives, one can mention Diallo and Kim [1989], 
who are interested in asymmetric information, Scordis and Porat (1998), who address captive 
manager-owner conflicts, and Scordis, Barrese, and Yokohama (2007), who study the value of 
captives for their parent company. Though these topics are somewhat related to ours, their 
approach, which is empirical and econometric, is different.  
For  this  purpose,  a  model  derived  from  the  maxmin  expected  utility (MMEU) models of 
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Kelsey (1994) is developed.  A necessary consequence of  
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our model is that the insurance premium can be too high for a conventional insurance contract 
to find a market. This is in line with, and adds to, what authors like Einhorn and Hogarth 
(1985,  1986),  Gollier  (2005,  2007)  and  Cabantous  (2007)  find,  that  if  probabilities  are 
ambiguous, the insurer will ask for a higher premium, or even refuse altogether to provide 
insurance coverage. We study this problem with the aim of deriving the conditions under 
which a captive is a better solution than conventional insurance for addressing corporate risks 
characterized  by  ambiguity,  as  discussed  above.  Our  model  leads  to  as  yet  unpublished 
conditions for setting up a captive with reinsurance.  
The rest of our paper is organised as follows. The second section develops our model for 
insuring ambiguous risks, and the third presents and discusses the conditions under which a 
captive is economically attractive. A fourth section concludes.   
2.   Insuring risks under ambiguous distributions: the model 
 
Under conditions of ambiguity in Ellsberg’s (1961) sense, experiments have shown that the 
insured firm, the insurer, and the reinsurer can all have different estimates of the unknown 
probability distribution (Cabantous, 2007). This is in line with the ambiguity hypothesis of 
Einhorn and Hogarth [1985, 1986]. These authors assume that an agent implicitly calculates a 
‘judged probability’ function which can be either larger or smaller than what they term an 
‘anchor probability’. They describe an ‘anchor probability’ as a first estimate of the unknown 
probability.  When losses are at stake and when the agent is ambiguity averse, this estimate is 
larger or more pessimistic
1, meaning higher cumulative probabilities of losses, so that a more 
pessimistic  distribution  dominates,  in  the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, a less 
pessimistic one.  
Gilboa  and  Schmeidler  [1989]  and  Kelsey  [1994]  developed  a  discrete  maxmin  expected 
utility (MMEU) model in which an economic agent takes into account a pessimistic estimate 
of some poorly known probability distribution. Ozdenoren, Casadessus and Klibanoff (2000) 
suitably generalized their approach to continuous probability distributions. Bose, Ozderenen 
and Pape (2006) show, in the context of auctions, that ambiguity, and situations such as the 
one described by Ellsberg (1961), can be equivalently described by Gilboa and Schmeidler’s 
MMEU  approach.  Gilboa  and  Schmeidler  (1989)  and  Kelsey  (1994)  developed  a  discrete 
maxmin expected utility (MMEU) model in which an economic agent takes into account a 
pessimistic estimate of some poorly known probability distribution. Ozdenoren, Casadessus 
and  Klibanoff  [2000]  suitably  generalized  their  approach  to  continuous  probability  
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distributions.  Bose,  Ozderenen  and  Pape  [2004]  Ln  show,  in  the  context of auctions, that 
ambiguity, and situations such as the one described by Ellsberg [1961], are compatible with 
Kelsey’s  MMEU  approach.  Applying  this  MMEU  approach  in  the  case  of  insurance,  we 
describe the case where, under a discrete distribution of losses, the insured, the insurer, and 
the reinsurer, have different perceptions of the distribution of losses. This is related to Einhorn 
and  Hogarth’s  (1985,  1986)  model.  Moreover,  their  conclusions,  rather  than  those  of  the 
standard subjective expected utility (SEU) model, have been vindicated by experiment (Di 
Mauro and Maffioletti, 2001). Therefore, our MMEU approach seems appropriate.  
Let us now develop our model. Let L0, L1, L2,  … , Li, … Ln be the possible losses, with L0=0 
< L1 < L2 <  … < Li <  Li+1 <… < Ln-1 < Ln =  L with discrete probability distributions Pd {p0, 
p1, p2,  … , pi, … pn} ( 0
n
1 i
i p p = ∑
=
). Let probability distribution Pd {p0, p1, p2,  … , pi, … pn} be 
a distribution that is possible according to the agent’s information, but is less pessimistic than 
Pd, with p1 > p1, p2 > p2… , pi > pi, … pn > pn, and at least one j (0 < j < n) such that pj > pj. Pd 
dominates  distribution  P  in  the  sense  of  first-order  stochastic  dominance  and  is  the  most 
pessimistic  distribution  within  the  set  of  distributions  that  the  firm  assumes  possible  and 
compatible with the information available. Let U be the insured firm’s utility function, which 
we assume to be a strictly increasing, twice differentiable and strictly concave function. We 
also assume that an insurer is able to offer an insurance policy providing for an insurance 
premium p with a deductible D, calculated on the basis of the insured firm’s distribution Pd. 
Our results have been derived using the following assumptions: 
 
Assumption 1: The utility function is strictly increasing and concave, continuous and twice 
differentiable. 
 
Assumption  2:  The  subjective  set  of  distributions  according  to  which  the  insured  party  is 
assumed to use for its decisions is a set of distributions for the possible losses L0=0 < L1 < L2 
<  … < Li <  Li+1 <… < Ln-1 < Ln =  L  defined as the set of distributions Sd {s0, s1, s2,  … , si, 
… sn} such that, if Pd = {p0, p1, p2,  … , pi, … pn} ( 0
n
1 i
i p p = ∑
=
), and Pd = {p0, p1, p2,  … , pi, … 
pn} one has:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
1 Gollier (2007) points out that “pessimism  is another word for ambiguity aversion”.  
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p1 > s1 > p1, p2 > s2 > p2… , pi > si > pi, … pn > sn > pn, with at least one i (0 < i < n) such that 
sj > pj. 
 
Assumption 3: The decision criterion is MEU on the basis of the limiting distribution Pd = {p0, 
p1, p2,  … , pi, … pn} (the most pessimistic distribution). 
 
The firm’s minmax expected utility under this policy is, under its Pd distribution : 
 
MMEU =  ] ) 0 , D L sup( L R [ U p i i
n
0 i
i p - - + - ∑
=
           (1) 
 
In  this  equation,  ) 1 ]( [ ) 1 )]( 0 , [sup( a D L E a D L E i i + - = + - = p ,  is  the  insurance  premium, 







j p P ., the first-order condition for maximization of MMEU is : 
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In this equation, h is a state of nature such that, for all i < h, L <  D; for i = h, L <  D,  and for  
j > h,  L >  D. For any given a > 0, the second-order condition ensures a unique solution in D 
since : 
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Since U”(Wi) always strictly negative, this is always negative, so that there always exists one, 
and only one optimal solution D that obeys the first-order condition (2). Let E(Li – D) be the 
mean of Li – D; we also have : 
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This quantity is always strictly positive, whence, defining the optimum insurance coverage, Ln 
- D though equation (2) as an implicit function C(a) of the load factor a (the demand for 




¶ < 0, so that this demand function is strictly decreasing.   
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We now discuss the behaviour of both the insurer and the reinsurer if the distribution is not 
well known. It is reasonable to assume that both the reinsurer and the insurer, not knowing the 
actual distribution, will assume a more pessimistic probability distribution of the losses Li (i > 
0) than the insured firm. Why in practice an insurance company will have less information 
than  the  insured  firm  about  the  loss  distribution  P  and  will  therefore  resort  to  a  more 
pessimistic distribution in order to price its premium, is open to discussion. Several general 
reasons have recently been stated by several authors. Gollier (2007) invokes a number of 
reasons, among which the most important are adverse selection (some agents are more risky 
than the average population, but the reasons for this cannot be observed fully), so that insurers  
will increase their premium rates for all their clients, ex ante moral hazard (the insured will 
not disclose some pertinent information, such as its efforts to decrease the insured risks), and 
ex post moral hazard (the risk of fraudulent claims). Cabantous (2007) discusses the general 
problem  of  ambiguity  aversion,  which  she  defines  as  “uncertainty  about  the  probability”, 
especially in the case of risks with “ a lack of large, reliable historical data base”; even if there 
is  a  consensual  but  imprecise  probability,  ambiguity  will  induce  insurers  to  set  higher 
premiums, and, in the case in which there are conflicting estimates of probability ranges, 
higher premiums than in the consensual case.  
It seems reasonable to assume that the insured firm will not disclose part of the information 
available to it to any external party. Such disclosure can be costly or technically difficult, and 
it could reveal secret details of the firm’s technology. Proprietary information and private 
information give the firm a competitive edge, and in many cases is “unarticulated, and hardly 
even articulable” (Hayek, 1988) meaning that it cannot even be clearly stated. Even if the 
insured firm will disclose such information, it is reasonable to assume that the insurer will not 
without high costs have the ability to gather such highly technical information; in addition, 
such information might not appear sufficiently trustworthy. 
In the case of a reinsurer, things can be quite different. Reinsurers usually have larger capital 
reserves, and overall operate at a much larger scale than ordinary insurers; thus they can afford 
technical and engineering expertise and acquire better information on risk distributions. They 
also have better statistics on the probabilities of large losses than ordinary insurers. Finally, 
the establishment of a captive which can directly negotiate with a reinsurance company can be 
more effective in protecting private technical information held by the firm.  
Let  us  specify  more  precisely  these  assumptions.  It  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  the 
insurer, in its assessment of the distribution P, due to the above information problems under 
possibly conflicting estimates of the distributions, will increase its premium above the optimal  
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premium calculated on the basis of the insured firm’s estimate of the distribution.  However, 
in the limiting case of consensual but still ambiguous estimates, the insurer could accept the 
already pessimistic distribution Pd. As far as the reinsurer is concerned, one can reasonably 
assume that it is concerned only with the higher losses. Let us assume for simplification that 
the reinsurer is covering only large losses, for instance, losses above the loss Lm with m < n 
The reinsurance market especially addresses the fact that insurers are constrained by their size 
not to insure major risks, but in many cases they can achieve a lower price by reinsuring, so 
that insurers can also be driven by market forces to reinsure the risk of the higher losses. Thus, 
under our hypotheses, the reinsurer will cover only the risk of the higher loss Lj (Lj > Lm > 0 
for some m < n) in terms of non-proportional reinsurance. Although this is a simplifying 
assumption, we also assume that the load factor a is the same for the insurer and the reinsurer, 
as argued by Blazenko (1986). Thus, the insurer will cover only the risk of the lower losses Li, 
0 < i < m, for which it has less information than the insured firm, but as much information as 
the  reinsurer.  As  far  as  the  largest  risks  are  concerned,  the  reinsurer  can  be  assumed  to 
possibly know better the probability distributions than the insurer, but less than the insured 




All this results in the following hypotheses : 
 
pi < pid  <  pir  = piR         (0 < i < m)                                              (5) 
And : 
pi < pid  <  piR <  pir         (m < i < n)                                              (6) 
 
We assume that an insurer is able to offer an insurance policy with an insurance premium 
pd and a deductible D. The question now is whether this insurance coverage is marketable or 
not, that is, acceptable or not for the insured firm. This insurance premium, with a > 0 being 
the load factor, is assumed to be exogenous. This premium is calculated under the distribution 
of losses assumed by the insurer (with reinsurance of the risk of the higher losses Lj). If the 
insurer  reinsures  the  risk  of  the  higher  losses,  Lj,  this  leads  to  a  reinsurance  premium 
calculated according to the reinsurer’s estimate of the distribution pertinent for the higher risk 
(PR), More precisely :  
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pr =  Er(Li– D)(1+ a) + ER(Lj– D)(1+ a)     (0 < i < m < j < n)                       (7) 
 
Let us define the differences between the probability distributions p as assumed by the insurer 
(pir for 1< i < m), and by the reinsurer (pjRfor m < j < n), and their respective counterparts in 
the insured firm’s estimates as : 
 
 qir = pir – pid           (0 < i < m)                                                                          (8) 
 
And :  
 
qjR = pjR – pjd           (m < j < n)                                                                          (9) 
 
 
Clearly, according to our hypotheses, qir  > 0  (0 < i < m), and qjR  > 0  (m < j < n). It is evident 
that, if we consider the MEU function of the insured firm taking into account the premium 












¶   (m < j < n), and   0
q





  (0 
< i < m); 0
q





 (m < j < n) , so that  MEU and the deductible S are strictly decreasing 
with the qir  (0 < i < m), and the qjR  (m < j < n).  
 
3. Conditions underlying the attractiveness of a captive 
 
Equation  (2)  gives  as  an  implicit  function  the  demand  for  insurance,  which  is  a  strictly 
decreasing function of a. However, if one assumes that both the insurer and the reinsurer are 
risk-neutral, the supply curve will be a vertical line a = constant. This also means the load 
factor a, interpreted as the price of insurance coverage, is exogenous. It reflects the costs of 
coverage with a suitable mark-up for profit; it is unique if the market is perfectly competitive. 
Thus, as shown on Figure 1, for each value of a (for example a1) the equilibrium demand for 
insurance is the intercept of the demand line and of a vertical line with a = constant, provided 
such an intercept exists for a positive and meaningful value of coverage (i.e. to the left of a0). 
If the insurer, as is assumed here, covers the risks for the smaller loss L1, the deductible D 
(besides being nonnegative) has to be smaller than Lm.    
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Thus,  given  our  assumptions,  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition  for  feasibility  of 
insurance coverage is: 
 
0 < D < Ln                                                                (9) 
 
Proposition 2 leads us to discuss several possibilities that can occur in terms of the optimal 
insurance decision for the insured firm.  
Firstly, in the limiting case where p1r = p1d and p2rr = p2d, and if 0 < D < L1, insurance with 
reinsurance, or establishing a captive with reinsurance, is indifferent.  
Secondly, still under p1r = p1d, if p2d < p2rr, and if 0 < D < L1, establishing a captive with 
reinsurance is the optimal solution. This means that cooperation between the captive and the 
reinsurer will provide some additional information about the distribution of the larger loss, 
resulting in the economically more attractive solution of a captive with reinsurance. This is 
empirically observed as discussed in Lesourd and Schilizzi [2003: chapter 7] and others.  
Thirdly,  if  p1d  <  p1r,  and  if  p2d = p2rr, and if 0 < D < L1, establishing a captive with 
reinsurance is again the optimal solution. This means that the captive has some additional 
information about the distribution of the smaller loss, but that direct access to reinsurance 
provides no additional information about its distribution; this again leads to the economically 
more attractive solution of a captive with reinsurance.  
Fourthly, if p1d < p1r, and if p2d < p2rr, and if 0 < D < L1, establishing a captive with 
reinsurance is a third case where it is an optimal solution. This means that the captive has 
some additional information about the distribution of the smaller loss, and its direct access to 
reinsurance also provides additional information about the distribution of the larger loss.  
It can also happen that the necessary condition for insurance (0 < D < L1) is not met, but 
that demand for reinsurance is still positive (L1 < D < L2). In this case, insurance coverage 
would be too expensive at current market price and under the insurer’s estimate of the risk. 
Then,  neither  the  external  insurance  company,  nor  an  insurance  captive  can  provide  any 
insurance coverage. A ‘reinsurance captive’ can, in this case, be useful to reinsure against the 
higher risk.  





This paper addresses the problem of insuring non-conventional risks such as environmental 
risks, product risks, medical malpractice, litigation-related risks and terrorism. Conventional 
risks, such as, for instance, risks related to road accidents, theft and fire, can be characterised 
by well known probability distributions which can be assumed to be available precisely and at 
low  cost.  On  the  contrary,  non-conventional  risks  are  characterised  by  the  fact  that  their 
probability distribution is not well known. In this case, the insured firm, the insurer and the 
reinsurer all differ in their estimates of the probability distribution, which leads to different 
prices on the insurance or reinsurance markets. This is a situation first described in terms of 
ambiguity by Ellsberg in 1961 and later by Einhorn and Hogarth [1985, 1986]. We address 
this problem by developing a maxmin expected utility model as in Gilboa and Schmeidler 
[1989], and as in Kelsey (1994), which, as shown by Bose, Ozdenoren and Pape [2004], is 
equivalent to a description in terms of ambiguity.  
More precisely, we assume on reasonable grounds that (1) reinsurance companies specialise in 
higher risks for which they have a competitive advantage leading to a lower estimate of the 
probability of these higher risks, that (2) insurers can be less informed than the insured firm 
about the lower risks and that (3) there can be a gain for an insured firm from direct access to 
reinsurance.  Under  these  assumptions,  we  are  led  to  specify  conditions  under  which  the 
operation of a captive with reinsurance of higher risks is optimal for the firm. This will occur 
whenever the insured firm, and the captive it establishes, has more information about the 
lower risks than a standard insurance company, and whenever direct access to reinsurance 
through a captive is profitable. Within a simplified framework, we provide as yet unpublished 
conditions on the perceived probabilities of both the lower and the higher risks. If the demand 
for insurance coverage is positive, under the above conditions, the operation of a captive with 
reinsurance is optimal.  
In the future, it might be interesting to extend our approach to more general distributions, and 
to introduce costly information as well as moral hazard into our model. Following Di Mauro 
and  Maffioletti  [2001]  and  other  earlier  work  such  as  Hogarth  and  Kunreuther  [1985], 
Camerer [1987], and Camerer and Kunreuther [1989], an experimental investigation of the 





Conditions  Pjd = pjR  Pjd < pjR 
0 < D < Lm 
Pid = pir    Captive with reinsurance, or   
insurance with reinsurance 
indifferent 
  Captive with reinsurance 
optimal,   insurance with 
reinsurance suboptimal 
Pid < pir    Captive with reinsurance 
optimal,   insurance with 
reinsurance suboptimal 
  Captive with reinsurance 
optimal,   insurance with 
reinsurance suboptimal 
Lm < D < Ln 
Pid = pir  Reinsurance captive, or 
insurance with reinsurance 
indifferent 
Reinsurance captive optimal, 
insurance with reinsurance 
suboptimal 
Pid < pir  Reinsurance captive optimal, 
insurance with reinsurance 
suboptimal 
Reinsurance captive optimal, 
insurance with reinsurance 
suboptimal 
Ln < D  
Pid = pir  No insurance and reinsurance 
feasible 
No insurance and reinsurance 
feasible 
Pid < pir  No insurance and reinsurance 
feasible 
No insurance and reinsurance 
feasible 
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